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Abstract
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) has been recognized as a promising way to assist future wireless
communications due to its high flexibility of deployment and scheduling. In this paper, we focus on
temporarily deployed UAVs that provide downlink data offloading in some regions under a macro base
station (MBS). Since the manager of the MBS and the operators of the UAVs could be of different interest
groups, we formulate the corresponding spectrum trading problem by means of contract theory, where
the manager of the MBS has to design an optimal contract to maximize its own revenue. Such contract
comprises a set of bandwidth options and corresponding prices, and each UAV operator only chooses the
most profitable one from all the options in the whole contract. We analytically derive the optimal pricing
strategy based on fixed bandwidth assignment, and then propose a dynamic programming algorithm
to calculate the optimal bandwidth assignment in polynomial time. By simulations, we compare the
outcome of the MBS optimal contract with that of a social optimal one, and find that a selfish MBS
manager sells less bandwidth to the UAV operators.
Index Terms
Unmanned aerial vehicles, cellular networks, contract theory, dynamic programming.
2I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid development of wireless communication enabled small-scale unmanned aerial ve-
hicles (UAVs) has created a variate of civil applications [1], from cargo delivery [2] and remote
sensing [3] to data relaying [4] and connectivity maintenance [5], [6]. From the aspect of wireless
communications, one major advantage of utilizing UAVs is their high probability of keeping line-
of-sight (LoS) signals with other communication nodes, alleviating the problem brought by severe
shadowing in urban or mountainous terrain [7], [8]. Different from high-altitude platforms which
are designed for long-term assignment above tens of kilometers height [9], small-scale UAVs
within only hundreds of meters off the ground can be deployed more quickly. In addition, the
properties like low-cost, high flexibility and ease of scheduling also make small-scale UAVs a
favorable choice in civil usages, in spite of their disadvantages such as low battery capacity [10].
One of the major problems in the UAV assisted wireless communications is to optimally
deploy UAVs, in which way mobile users can be better served [10]. Many studies have been
done to deal with this problem from distinctive viewpoints with respect to different objectives and
constraints [11]–[23]. Among them, the works in [11]–[14] considered the scenario consisting
only one UAV to provide with coverage, the works in [15]–[18] took into account multiple UAVs
to providing better services by joint coverage, and the works in [19]–[23] studied the coexistence
of base stations (BSs) and multi-UAVs, where data offloading becomes a major problem.
To be specific, in [11], the optimal height of a single UAV was deduced to maximize the
coverage radius. The authors of [12] minimized the transmission power of the UAV with fixed
coverage radius. The problem of maximizing the number of users that covered by one UAV is
studied in [13]. And the authors of [14] further took into account the interference from device-to-
device (D2D) users. For multiple UAVs, the coverage probability of a ground user was derived
in [15] . The work in [16] proposed a solution to minimize the number of UAVs to cover all
the users. The authors of [17] studied the deployment of multiple UAVs to achieve largest total
coverage area. And in [18], the total transmission power of UAVs was minimized while the
data rate for each user was guaranteed. With the consideration of BSs in the scenario, the gain
of deploying additional UAVs for offloading was discussed in [19]–[21]. The authors of [22]
focused on the optimal cell partition strategy to minimize average delay of the users in a cellular
3network with multiple UAVs. In [23], the optimal resource allocation was presented, where one
MBS, multiple small-cell base stations (SBSs) and multiple UAVs are involved.
Although UAV coverage and offloading problems have been widely discussed, few existing
studies consider the situation where UAV operators could be selfish individuals with different
objectives [24]. For instance, the venue owners and scenic area managers may want to temporarily
deploy their own UAVs to better serve their visitors, due to the temporarily increased number
of mobile users or the inconvenience of installing SBSs in remote areas [25]. In such cases, the
deployment of multiple UAVs depends on each UAV operator, and the solution is not likely to
be optimal as calculated by centralized algorithms. In addition, the wireless channel allocation
becomes a more critical problem since the bandwidth that the UAVs used to serve mobile users
has to be explicitly authorized by the MBS manager. Therefore, further studies need to be done
with respect to selfish UAV operators in UAV assisted offloading cellular networks.
In this paper, we focus on the scenario with one MBS that managed by the MBS manager,
and multiple SBS-enabled UAVs that owned by different UAV operators. To enable downlink
transmissions of the UAVs, each UAV operator has to buy a certain amount of bandwidth that
authorized by the MBS manager. However, the total usable bandwidth of the MBS is limited, and
selling part of the total bandwidth to the UAVs may harm the capacity of the MBS. Therefore,
payments to the MBS manager should be made by UAV operators. Here, contract theory [26]
can be applied as a tool to analyze the optimal contract that the MBS manager will design
to maximize its revenue. Specifically, such contract comprises a set of bandwidth options and
corresponding prices. Since each UAV operator only chooses the most profitable option from the
whole contract, the MBS manager has to guarantee that the contract is feasible, i.e., the option
that a UAV operator chooses from the contract is exactly the one that designed for it.
The main contributions of our work are listed as below:
1) We formulate the optimal contract design problem where the selfish MBS manager has
to decide the number of channels and the amount of price that designed for each type of
selfish UAV operator in order to realize data offloading.
2) We analytically deduce the optimal pricing strategy and propose our dynamic programming
algorithm to achieve the optimal bandwidth allocation efficiently.
43) We reveal some significant insights based on the simulation results, e.g., the selfish MBS
manager sells less bandwidth to the UAV operators compared with a social optimal result.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. Section II presents our system model and
formulates the optimal contract design problem. Section III theoretically deduces the optimal
solution and provides our dynamic programming algorithm. Section IV focuses on the height
of the UAVs and discuss its impact on the revenue of the MBS manager. Section V shows the
simulation results of the optimal contract. Finally, we conclude our paper in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
UAV1
MBS
UAV2
MBS Downlink
Mobile User
UAV Downlink
MBS Manager UAV Operator
Taking Charge
1 2
Fig. 1. The system model of UAV Assisted Offloading in Cellular Networks with 1 MBS manager and multiple UAV operators.
We consider a scenario with one MBS that run by the MBS manager, and N UAVs that run by
N different UAV operators, as shown in Fig. 1. The UAVs that deployed by the UAV operators
are assumed to serve mobile users with licensed spectrum1, and to be deployed at a unified
altitude H (designated by the MBS manager) and at different fixed horizontal locations. Each
UAV operator first has to buy a certain amount of bandwidth from the MBS manager, where
the utility and the cost of each individual should be addressed.
In the rest part of this section, we first present the wireless downlink model of the MBS
and the UAVs, then introduce the utility of the UAV operators as well as the cost of the MBS
manager, and finally formulate the contract design problem.
1The wireless backhaul connections between the UAVs and the MBS, however, are assumed to follow the standard MBS-SBS
communication regulations, and thus is not our major concern in this paper.
5A. Wireless Downlink Model
The air-to-ground wireless channel between a UAV and a mobile user mainly consists of
two parts, which are the Line-of-Sight (LoS) component and the None-Line-of-Sight (NLoS)
component [8]. Based on the study in [11], the probability of LoS for a user with elevation
angle θ (in degree) to a specific UAV is given by PLoS(θ) =
1
1 + a exp
(
− b[θ − a]
) , where a
and b are the parameters that depend on the specific terrain (like urban, rural, etc.).
Based on PLoS , the average pathloss from the UAV to the user can be given by (in dB):

LUAV (θ, d) = PLoS(θ) · LLoS(d) +
[
1− PLoS(θ)
]
· LNLoS(d),
LLoS(d) = 20 log (4pifd/c) + ηLoS,
LNLoS(d) = 20 log (4pifd/c) + ηNLoS,
(1)
where c is the speed of light, d is the distance between the UAV and the user, and f is the
frequency of the channel. LLoS(d) and LNLoS(d) are the pathloss of the LoS component and the
pathloss of the NLoS component, respectively. ηLoS , ηNLoS are the average additional loss that
depends on the environment. In contrast to the UAV-to-user wireless channel, the MBS-to-user
channels are considered as NLoS only, which gives us the average pathloss as:
LMBS(d) = 20 log (4pifd/c) + ηNLoS. (2)
For simplicity, we assume that different channels has similar f and the difference can be ignored.
To see the signal quality that each user could experience, we use γMBS(d) to denote the
Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) for MSB users at the distance d from the MBS. And we have
γMBS(d) =
[
PMBS − LMBS(d)
]
/N0, where PMBS is the transmission power of the MBS and
N0 is the power of background noise. Similarly, we use γUAV (d, θ) to denote the SNR for the
UAV users with elevation angle θ and distance d from a certain UAV, given as γUAV (d, θ) =[
PUAV − LUAV (d, θ)
]
/N0, where PUAV is the transmission power of the UAV.
It is also assumed that each user can automatically choose among the MBS and the UAVs
to obtain the best SNR. Therefore, it is necessary to find out in which region a certain UAV is
able to provide better SNR than the others (including the MBS and the other UAVs). We denote
the region where UAVn provides better SNR as UAVn’s effective offloading region, denoted by
Ωn. Let Λn(x) denote the boolean variable that indicates whether the user with the location x
(a two-dimensional vector) is in Ωn. Thus the area of Ωn can be calculated by Sn =
∫
Λi(x)dx.
6B. The Utility of the UAV operators
Each mobile user in an effective offloading region is assumed to access to the UAV randomly.
We call the density of the users in Ωn that want to connect to UAVn at any instant as the “active
user density” of UAVn, denoted by σn. And the corresponding concept, “active user number” εn,
describing the number of users that want to set up connects with UAVn in any moment, is given
by εn = Snσn. We assume that σn obeys Poisson distribution with mean value of ρn. Considering
a given location of UAVn (which makes Sn a constant), εn also becomes an Poisson-distribution
variable, with mean value µn = SNρn. Based on µn, we can classify the UAVs into multiple
types. Specifically, we refer to UAVn as a λ-type UAV if µn = λ, which means that there are
averagely λ users connecting to UAVn at any instant. The number of λ-type UAVs is denoted
by Nλ, where
∑
λNλ = N . For writing simplicity, we use random variable Xλ (instead of εn)
to denote the active user number of a λ-type UAV. The probability of Xλ = k is given by
P (Xλ = k) =
(λ)k
k!
e−λ, k = 0, 1, 2, · · · (3)
Without the loss of generality, we assume that each mobile user connecting to a UAV (or the
MBS) is allocated with one channel with fixed bandwidth B, in a frequency division pattern.
Due to the variation of the active user number, there is always a probability that an UAV fails to
serve the current active users. Therefore, the more channels are being obtained, the more utility
the UAV can achieve. The utility function of obtaining w channels for a λ-type UAV is denoted
by U(λ, w). Since the utility of obtaining no channels is 0, we have
U
(
λ, w
)
= 0, w = 0. (4)
The marginal utility of obtaining another channel depends on the probability that the current
number of channels is not sufficient for random user requests. Thus we have
U
(
λ, w
)
= U
(
λ, (w − 1)
)
+ P (Xλ ≥ w), w ≥ 1. (5)
Based on (4) and (5), we can derive the general term of the λ-type UAV’s utility as
U
(
λ, w
)
=
k=w∑
k=1
P (Xλ ≥ k), w ≥ 1. (6)
7C. Cost of the MBS manager
It is assumed that the MBS will not reuse the spectrum that is already sold, which implies the
MBS manager suffers a certain degree of loss as it sells the spectrum to UAV operators. The
active user number of the MBS is also assumed to follow the Poisson distribution. We denote
this random variable as XBS and the mean value of it as λBS . Therefore we have
P (XBS = k) =
(λBS)
k
k!
e−λBS , k = 0, 1, 2, · · · (7)
The total number of channels of the MBS is denoted by M , M ∈ Z+. Just like the situation of
UAVs, there is also a utility of a certain number of channels for the MBS manager, UBS(m),
representing the average number of users that m channels can serve, given as
UBS
(
m
)
= 0, m = 0, (8)
UBS
(
m
)
= UBS
(
m− 1
)
+ P (XBS ≥ m), m ≥ 1. (9)
Based on the utility of the MBS manager, we define the cost function C
(
m
)
as the utility loss
of reducing the number of channels from M to M −m, given as
C
(
m
)
= UBS
(
M
)
− UBS
(
M −m
)
=
M∑
k=M−m+1
P (XBS ≥ k). (10)
D. Contract Formulation
Since different types of UAVs have different demands, the MBS manager has to design a
contract which contains a set of “quality-price” options for all the UAV operators, denoted by{(
w(λ), p(λ)
) ∣∣ ∀λ ∈ Λ}. In this contract, w(λ) is the number of channels that designed to sell
to a λ-type UAV operator, and p(λ) is the corresponding price designed to be charged. Each(
w(λ), p(λ)
)
pair can be seen as a commodity with quality w(λ) at price p(λ).
However, each UAV operator is expected to choose the one that maximize its own profit
according to the whole contract. The contract is feasible if and only if any λ-type UAV operator
prefers the commodity
(
w(λ), p(λ)
)
to all the others [27]. And to achieve this, the first requr-
rement is the incentive compatible (IC) condition, implying that the commodity designed for a
λ-type UAV operator in the contract is indeed the best one for it, given by
U
(
λ, w(λ)
)
− p(λ) ≥ U
(
λ, w(λ′)
)
− p(λ′), ∀λ′ 6= λ. (11)
8The second requirement is the individual rational (IR) condition, meaning that the λ-type UAV
operator will not buy any channels if all of the options bring negative profits, given by
U
(
λ, w(λ)
)
− p(λ) ≥ U
(
λ, 0
)
− 0 = 0, (12)
where U
(
λ, 0
)
− 0 implies an “empty commodity” in the contract, which has no utility and no
price to be charged. To put it simple, a feasible contract has to satisfy the IC constraint and the
IR constraint, and any contract that satisfies the IC and IR constraints is feasible.
For the MBS manager, the overall revenue brought by the contract {w(λ), p(λ) | ∀λ ∈ Λ} is
R =
∑
λ∈Λ
(
Nλ · p(λ)
)
− C
(∑
λ∈Λ
Nλ · w(λ)
)
, (13)
where Nλ · p(λ) is the total payment obtained from λ-type UAV operators, and
∑
λ∈Λ
Nλ ·w(λ) is
the total number of channels that being sold. The objective of the MBS manager is to design
proper w(λ) and p(λ) for any given λ ∈ Λ, in which way it can maximize its own revenue with
the pre-consideration of each UAV operator’s behavior, given as
Rˆ = max
{w(λ)},{p(λ)}
∑
λ∈Λ
(
Nλ · p(λ)
)
− C
(∑
λ∈Λ
Nλ · w(λ)
)
,
s.t. U
(
λ, w(λ)
)
− p(λ) ≥ U
(
λ, w(λ′)
)
− p(λ′) ≥ 0, ∀λ, λ′ ∈ Λ and λ′ 6= λ,
U
(
λ, w(λ)
)
− p(λ) ≥ 0, ∀λ, λ′ ∈ Λ and λ′ 6= λ,
p(λ) ≥ 0, w(λ) = 0, 1, 2 · · · ∀λ ∈ Λ,∑
λ∈Λ
Nλ · w(λ) ≤M,
(14)
where the first two constraints represent the IC and the IR, and the last one indicates the limited
number of channels possessed by the MBS. In the rest part of our paper, the quality assignment
w(λ), and the pricing strategy p(λ), are the two most basic concerns. In addition, we call the
contract that optimizes the problem in (14) as the “MBS optimal contract”.
III. OPTIMAL CONTRACT DESIGN
In this section, we exploit some basic properties of our problem in Section III-A. By utilizing
these properties, we provide the optimal pricing strategy based on the fixed quality assignment
in Section III-B. Next, we analyze and transform the optimal quality assignment problem in
9Section III-C, in which way it can be solved by the proposed dynamic programming algorithm
given in Section III-D. And finally we discuss the social optimal contract in Section III-E.
To facilitate the writing of our following discussions, we put all the types {λ} in the ascending
order, given by {λ1, · · ·λt, · · ·λT} where 1 ≤ t ≤ T and λt1 < λt2 if t1 < t2. Note that, in this
case we call λt1 as a “lower type” and λt2 as a “higher type”. In addition, we also simplify Nλt
as Nt, w(λt) as wt and p(λt) as pt in the discussions below.
A. Basic Properties
We first take a look at the utility function U(λ, w). As given in Fig. 2, we can see that the
marginal utility for a UAV operator decreases as the quality w gets larger. In addition, a UAV
with higher type (λ= 18) consider a certain bandwidth quality w more valuable than a lower
type (λ=12). To prove the above observations, we first have to provide a more basic conclusion
with respect to a property of Poisson distribution, on which the utility function is defined.
0 10 20 30
w
0
5
10
15
20
U
(λ
,w
)
(a) UAV’s utility function
λ=18
λ=12
0 10 20 30
m
0
5
10
15
20
C
(m
)
(b) MBS’s cost function
M=120
Fig. 2. An illustration of the profiles of the UAV’s utility function and the MBS’s cost function.
Lamma 1. Given that Xλ and Xλ′ are two Poisson distribution random variables with mean
values λ and λ′ respectively, if λ > λ′ > 0, then P (Xλ ≥ k) > P (Xλ′ ≥ k) for any k ∈ Z
+.
The proof of Lemma 1 can be found in Appendix A. This lemma is particularly singled out
since it is used in many of the following propositions.
Proposition 1. The utility function U(λ, w) monotonously increases with the type λ and the
quality w, where λ > 0 and w ∈ N. In addition, the marginal increase of U(λ, w) with respect
to w gets smaller as w increases.
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The proof of Proposition 1 is provided in Appendix B. This proposition provides a basic
property for us to design the optimal contract in the rest of our paper. From Fig. 2 (a) we can
also notice that U(λ, w) converges to a fixed value as w →∞, given by
lim
w→∞
U
(
λ, w
)
=
∞∑
k=1
P (Xλ ≥ k) =
∞∑
k=1
k ·
(λ)k
k!
e−λ =
∞∑
k=0
k ·
(λ)k
k!
e−λ = λ. (15)
Intuitively, the utility of a λ-type UAV cannot exceed its active user number even if excessive
channels are allocated. Such conclusion provides another way to comprehend the meaning of
U(λ, w), that is, the number of effectively served users of the UAV.
Based on Lemma 1 and Proposition 1, we exploit another important property of U(λ, w),
which says that a certain amount of quality improvement is more attractive to a higher type
UAV than a lower type UAV. This property can be referred to as the “increasing preference (IP)
property”, and we write it as the following proposition:
Proposition 2. (IP property) : For any UAV types λ > λ′ > 0 and channel qualities w > w′ ≥ 0,
the following inequality holds: U(λ, w)− U(λ, w′) > U(λ′, w)− U(λ′, w′).
The proof of IP property is given in Appendix C. With the help of this property, we are able
to deduce the best pricing strategy in the next subsection.
B. Optimal Pricing Strategy
In this subsection, we use fixed quality assignment {wt} to analytically deduce the optimal
pricing strategy {pt}.
Based on the previous work on contract theory (such as in [27]), the IC & IR constraints
and the IP property of the utility function in a contract design problem can directly lead to the
conclusion as below:
Proposition 3. For the contract
{
(wt, pt)
}
with the IC & IR constraints and the IP property,
the following statements are simultaneously satisfied:
• The relation of types and qualities: λi < λj =⇒ wi ≤ wj .
• The relation of qualities and prices: wi < wj ⇐⇒ pi < pj .
This conclusion contains basic properties of a feasible contract. It indicates that a higher price
has to be associated with a higher quality, and a higher quality means higher price should be
charged. Although different qualities are not allowed to be associated with the same price, it is
11
still possible that different types of UAVs are assigned with the same channel quality and thus
the same price.
Lamma 2. For the contract
{
(wt, pt)
}
with the IC & IR constraints and the IP property, the
folowing three conditions are the necessary conditions and sufficient conditions to determine a
feasible pricing:
• 0 ≤ w1 ≤ w2 ≤ · · · ≤ wT ,
• 0 ≤ p1 ≤ U(λ1, w1),
• pk−1 + A ≤ pk ≤ pk−1 +B, for k = 2, 3, · · · , T ,
where A =
[
U(λk−1, wk)− U(λk−1, wk−1)
]
and B =
[
U(λk, wk)− U(λk, wk−1)
]
.
The proof of Lemma 2 is given in Appendix A. It provides an important guideline to design
the prices for different types of UAVs. It implies that with fixed quality assignment {wt}, the
proper scope of the price pk depends on the value of pk−1.
In the following, we provide the optimal pricing strategy of the MBS manager with fixed
quality assignment {wt}. Here we call {wt} a feasible quality assignment if w1 ≤ w2 ≤ · · · ≤ wT ,
i.e., the first condition in Lemma 2 should be satisfied. The maximum achievable revenue of the
MBS manager with fixed and feasible quality assignment {wt} is given by
R∗
(
{wt}
)
= max
{pt}
[
T∑
t=1
(
Nt · pt
)
− C
( T∑
t=1
Nt · wt
)]
. (16)
From the above equation we can see that, the key point is to maximize
∑T
t=1
(
Nt · pt
)
, since
the cost function is constant with fixed quality assignment {wt}. Accordingly, we provide the
following proposition for the optimal pricing strategy:
Proposition 4. (Optimal Pricing Strategy) : Given that
{
(wt, pt)
}
is a feasible contract with
feasible quality assignment {wt}, the unique optimal pricing strategy {pˆt} is:
 pˆ1 = U(λ1, w1),pˆk = pˆk−1 + U(λk, wk)− U(λk, wk−1), ∀k = 2, 3, · · · , T. (17)
Its proof is given in Appendix E. According to this proposition, we write the general formula
of the optimal prices {pˆt} as
pˆt = U(λ1, w1) +
t∑
i=1
θi, ∀t = 2, · · ·T, (18)
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where θ1 = 1 and θi = U(λi, wi)− U(λi, wi−1) for i = 2, · · ·T . The optimal pricing strategy is
able to maximize R and achieve R∗ with any given feasible quality assignment. However, what
{wt} is able to maximize R
∗ and achieve the overall maximum value Rˆ is still unsolved.
C. Optimal Quality Assignment Problem
In this subsection, we analyze the optimal quality assignment problem based on the results in
Section III-B, and transform this problem into an easier form, as a preparation for the dynamic
programming algorithm in Section III-D.
The optimal quality assignment problem is given by
Rˆ = max
{wt}
[
R∗
(
{wt}
)]
,
s.t.
T∑
t=1
Ntwt ≤ M, w1 ≤ w2 ≤ · · · ≤ wT , and wt = 0, 1, 2 · · ·
(19)
where R∗({wt}) is the best revenue of a given quality assignment as given in (16). Due to the
optimal pricing {pˆt} in (18), we derive the expression of R
∗
(
{wt}
)
as follows:
R∗
(
{wt}
)
=
T∑
t=1
(
Nt · pˆt
)
− C
( T∑
t=1
Nt · wt
)
=
T∑
t=1
{
Nt
[
U(λ1, w1) +
t∑
i=1
θi
]}
− C
( T∑
t=1
Nt · wt
)
=
T∑
i=1
U(λi, wi) ·
T∑
t=i
Nt +
T−1∑
i=1
[
U(λi+1, wi) ·
T∑
t=i+1
Nt
]
− C
( T∑
t=1
Nt · wt
)
=
T∑
t=1
[
Ct · U(λt, wt)−Dt · U(λt+1, wt)
]
− C
( T∑
t=1
Nt · wt
)
,
(20)
where Ct =
( T∑
i=t
Ni
)
, Dt =
( T∑
i=t+1
Ni
)
for t < T , and DT = 0. Here, we are able to guarantee
that Ct > Dt ≥ 0, ∀t = 1, 2, · · · , T , since Nt > 0, ∀t = 1, 2, · · · , T . As we can observed
from (20), wi and wj (i 6= j) are separated from each other in the first term. This is a non-
negligible improvement to find the best {wt}.
Definition 1. A set of functions
{
Gt(wt)
∣∣∣ t = 1, 2, · · ·T}, with the quality wt as the independent
variable of Gt(·), with Ct and Dt (Ct > Dt ≥ 0) as the constants of Gt(·), is given by:
Gt(wt) = Ct · U(λt, wt)−Dt · U(λt+1, wt), wt = 0, 1, 2, · · · ∀t = 1, 2, · · ·T. (21)
Based on (20) and Definition 1, we have R∗
(
{wt}
)
=
T∑
t=1
Gt(wt)−C
( T∑
t=1
Nt ·wt
)
. The meaning
of Gt(wt) is the independent gain of setting wt for the λt-type UAVs regardless of the cost.
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Based on {Gt(wt)}, we can rewrite the optimization problem in (19) as:
Rˆ = max
{wt}
[
T∑
t=1
Gt(wt)− C
(
T∑
t=1
Ntwt
)]
s.t.
T∑
t=1
Ntwt ≤ M, w1 ≤ w2 ≤ · · · ≤ wT , and wt = 0, 1, 2 · · ·
(22)
This problem can be further transformed into an equivalent one, given by
Rˆ = max
{W=0,1,··· ,M}
{
max
{wt}
[
T∑
t=1
Gt(wt)
]
− C
(
W
)}
,
s.t.
T∑
t=1
Ntwt ≤ W, w1 ≤ w2 ≤ · · · ≤ wT , and wt = 0, 1, 2 · · ·
(23)
From this formulation, we can see that the optimal revenue can be acquired by trying each
possible W as the number of channels being sold. For each fixed W , we only have to focus on
how to maximize
T∑
t=1
Gt(wt), given as
max
{wt}
T∑
t=1
Gt(wt),
s.t.
T∑
t=1
Ntwt ≤ W, w1 ≤ w2 ≤ · · · ≤ wT , and wt = 0, 1, 2 · · ·
(24)
By calculating all the best results of (24) with different possible values of W , we are able to
obtain the optimal solution of (23) by further taking into account C(W ).
Therefore, we regard (24) as the key problem to be solved. The proposed dynamic program-
ming algorithm for this problem is presented in the next subsection.
D. Algorithm for the MBS Optimal Contract
In what follows, we first show the way of considering (24) as a distinctive form of the knapsack
problem [28], then provide our recurrence formula to calculate its maximum value Gmax, next
present the method to find the parameters {wt} that achieveGmax, and finally provide an overview
of whole solution including the optimal quality assignment {wˆt} and the optimal pricing {pˆt}.
1) A special knapsack problem:
First, we have to take a look at the constraints about the optimization parameters {wi}. Since
wi = 0, 1, 2 · · · and
∑T
t=1Ntwt ≤W , we have wt ≤W . To distinguish from the notation of
weight in the following discussions, we use K instead of W as the common upper bound of wt,
∀t∈ [1, T ], where K≤W . And we rewrite the constraint as wt≤K. Therefore for each t, there
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are totally K+1 optional values of wt, given by {0, 1 · · ·K}. And the corresponding results of
Gt(wt) are {Gt(0), Gt(1), Gt(2), · · · , Gt(K)}, which represent the values of different object that
we can choose. In addition, we interpret the constraint
∑T
t=1Ntwt ≤W as the weight constraint
in the knapsack problem, where W is the weight capacity of the bag and setting wt = k means
taking up the weight of kNt.
TABLE I
ALL THE OPTIONAL OBJECTS TO BE SELECTED
Type Optional Values Corresponding Weights
1 Type λ1 G1(0) G1(1) G1(2) · · · G1(K) 0 N1 2N1 · · · KN1
2 Type λ2 G1(0) G2(1) G2(2) · · · G2(K) 0 N2 2N2 · · · KN2
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
T Type λT GT (0) GT (1) GT (2) · · · GT (K) 0 NT 2NT · · · KNT
For the convenience of understanding, we list the values and the weight of different options
in Table I. Each row presents all the options of a type and we should choose an option for each
type. And the kth option in the tth row provides us with the value of Gt(k) and the weight of
kNt. Due to the constraint of w1≤w2≤· · ·≤wT , we cannot choose the (k+1)
th, (k+2)th · · ·
options in the tth row if we have already chosen the kth option in the (t+1)th row. Therefore,
the algorithm introduced below is basically to start from the last row and end at the first row.
2) The recurrence formula to calculate the maximum value Gmax:
The key nature of designing a dynamic programming algorithm is to find the sub-problems
of the overall problem and write the correct recurrence formula. Here we define OPT (t, k, w),
∀t ∈ [1, T ], ∀k ∈ [0, K] and ∀w ∈ [0,W ], as the optimal outcome that includes the decisions
from the T th row to the tth row, with the conditions that 1) the kth option in the tth row is
chosen and 2) the occupied weight is no more than w. Since the algorithm starts from the T th
row, we first provide the calculation of OPT (T, k, w), ∀k ∈ [0, K] and ∀w ∈ [0,W ], given as
OPT
(
T, k, w
)
=

 GT (k), if w ≥ kNt,−∞, if w < kNt, (25)
where −∞ implies that OPT (T, k, w) is impossible to be achieved due to the lack of weight
capacity. This expression is straight forward since it only includes the T th row in Table I. From
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OPT
(
T, k, w
)
, we can calculate OPT
(
t, k, w
)
for all t ∈ [1, T − 1], k ∈ [0, K] and w ∈ [0,W ]
by the following recurrence formula:
OPT
(
t, k, w
)
=


max
l=k,··· ,K
[
Gt(k) +OPT
(
t + 1, l, w − kNt
)]
, if w ≥ kNt,
−∞, if w < kNt.
(26)
The meaning of this formula is: If we want to choose k in the tth row, then the option that made
in the (t+ 1)th row must be within [k,K] due to the constraint of w1 ≤ · · · ≤ wT . In addition,
choosing k in the tth row with total weight limit of w indicates that there is only w − kNt left
for the other rows from t+ 1 to T . And if w − kNt < 0, the outcome is −∞ since choosing k
in the tth row is impossible.
Let Gmax denote max
{wt}
T∑
t=1
Gt(wt), then we have the following expression:
Gmax = max
k=0···K
[
OPT
(
1, k,W
)]
. (27)
It means that we have to calculate OPT (1, k,W ) for all k ∈ [0, K], which can be obtained by
iteratively using (26).
3) The method to find the parameters {wt} that achieve Gmax:
Note that the above calculation only consider the value of the optimal result Gmax. To record
what exact values of {wt} are chosen for this optimal result by the algorithm, we have to add
another data structure, given as D(t, k, w). We let D(t, k, w) = l if OPT (t, k, w) chooses l to
maximize its value in the upper line of (26), which is given by
D
(
t, k, w
)
=


arg max
l=k,··· ,K
[
Gt(k) +OPT
(
t + 1, l, w − kNt
)]
, if w ≥ kNt,
0, if w < kNt.
(28)
After acquiring Gmax in (27), we can use D(t, k, w) to inversely find the optimal values of {wt}
along the “path” of the optimal solution. Specifically, we have

wˆ1 = arg max
k=0···K
[
OPT
(
1, k,W
)]
,
wˆt = D
(
t− 1, wˆt−1,W −
t−2∑
i=1
wˆiNi
)
, ∀t = 2, · · · , T,
(29)
where we define
∑t−2
i=1 wˆiNi as 0 if t−2 = 0, just for writing simplicity.
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4) An overview of whole solution:
By now, we have presented the key part of our solution, i.e., the dynamic programming
algorithm to solve the optimization problem in (24). The problem in (23), i.e., our final goal,
can be directly solved by setting different values of W in (24) and compare the corresponding
results with the consideration of C(W ).
An overview of our entire solution is given in Algorithm 1. It can be observed that the
computational complexity of calculating OPT (t, k, w) for all k∈ [0, K], w∈ [0,W ] and t∈ [1, T ]
is O(TK2W ). Therefore, the overall complexity is O(MTK2W ), which can also be written
as O(TM4) since W ≤ M and K ≤ W . Although M4 seems to be non-negligible, there are
usually no more than hundreds of available channels of a MBS to be allocated in practice.
Algorithm 1: The algorithm of optimal contract for UAV offloading.
Input: Type information {λ1, · · ·λT}, {N1, · · ·NT}, and the number of total channels M .
Output: Optimal pricing strategy {pˆ1, · · · pˆT}, optimal quality assignment {wˆ1, · · · wˆT}.
1 begin
2 Calculate Gt(k) for all t ∈ [1, T ] and k ∈ [0,M ] by (21);
3 Calculate C(m) for all m ∈ [0,M ] by (10);
4 Initialize Rˆ = 0, wt = 0 for all t ∈ [1, T ], and pt = 0 for all t ∈ [1, T ];
5 for W is from 0 to M do
6 Let K = W , to be the upper bound for each wi;
7 Calculate OPT (T, k, w) for ∀k ∈ [0, K] and ∀w ∈ [0,W ] by (25);
8 Calculate OPT (t, k, w) for ∀k ∈ [0, K], ∀w ∈ [0,W ] and ∀t ∈ [1, T−1] by (26);
9 Acquire Gmax from {OPT (1, w, t)} according to (27);
10 if Gmax − C(W ) > Rˆ then
11 Update the overall maximum revenue Rˆ = Gmax − C(W );
12 Update wˆt for all t ∈ [1, T ] according to (28) and (29);
13 Update pˆt for all t ∈ [1, T ] based on {wˆt} according to (17);
14 end
15 end
16 end
E. Social Optimal Contract
To better discuss the effectiveness of the above MBS optimal contract, in the following, we
briefly discuss another contract that aims to maximize social welfare. In our context, social
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welfare indicates the sum of the revenue of the MBS and the total profits of the UAVs, which
also means the increase of the number of users that can be served by the overall system. The
objective is given by
Sˆ = max
{w(λ)},{p(λ)}
∑
λ∈Λ
(
Nλ · U
(
λ, w(λ)
))
− C
(∑
λ∈Λ
Nλ · w(λ)
)
, (30)
where the first term is the total utility of the UAVs, the second term is the cost of the MBS, and
we omit the constraints since they are the same with those in (14). This optimization problem
has a similar structure with (14) and can be solved by the proposed dynamic programming
algorithm with only minor changes. To calculate the optimal {w(λ)} and {p(λ)}, we need to
replace Gt(k) by NtU(t, k) in line 2 of Table I. In addition, we use Umax to replace Gmax to
represent the maximum overall utility of the UAVs. At last, the equation in line 11 of Table I
should be replaced by Sˆ = Umax−C(W ) to represent the maximum social welfare. For writing
convenience, in the rest part of this paper, we call the solutions of (14) and (30) as the “MBS
optimal contract” and the “social optimal contract”, respectively. In addition, the relation of
social welfare and MBS’s revenue is illustrated in Fig. 3.
Cost of the MBS Manager Revenue of the MBS Manager Total Profits of all the UAVs
Total Utilities of all the UAVs
Social Welfare
Total Price Being Charged
Fig. 3. The relation of the social welfare, the revenue of the MBS manager, and the total profit of the UAVs operators.
IV. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we briefly discuss the impact of the height of the UAVs, H . Since H influences
the optimal revenue of the MBS Rˆ, through the types of the UAVs {λt}, we first discuss the
impact of H on {λt} in Section IV-A and then discuss the impact of {λt} on Rˆ in Section IV-B.
A. The Impact of the Height on the UAV Types
Proposition 5. With fixed transmission power PUAV and PMBS , fixed terrain parameters a, b,
ηLos and ηNLoS , fixed average active user density σn, fixed horizontal locations of the UAVs,
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and unified height H ∈ [0,+∞) of the UAVs, there exists a height Hˆn that can maximize the
effective offloading area of UAVn.
The proof of this proposition is given in Appendix F. From this proposition, we know that in the
process of H varying from 0 to +∞, different UAVs are able to achieve their maximum effective
offloading areas at different heights. However, if all the UAVs are horizontally symmetrically
distributed around the MBS (as shown in Fig. 7 in Section V-B), their optimal heights will be the
same since the UAVs have symmetrical positions. Therefore, there is a globally optimal height
Hˆ that can maximize Sn, for all n ∈ {1, 2, · · ·N}. Due to the fact that the types of the UAVs
is given by λn = σnSn, we can also achieve the largest type for each UAV.
B. The Impact of the UAV Types on the Optimal Revenue
For any two random sets of types {λ1, · · ·λT1} and {λ
′
1, · · ·λ
′
T2
}, there is no obvious relation
of the outcomes of the corresponding two MBS optimal contracts. However, some properties
can be explored when we add some constraints, as given in the following proposition:
Proposition 6. Given a fixed number of types T , two sets of types {λt}, {λ
′
t}, and the constraint
λt ≤ λ
′
t, ∀t ∈ [1, T ], we have Rˆ ≤ Rˆ
′, where Rˆ is the MBS’s revenue of a MBS optimal contract
with inputs {λt} and Rˆ
′ is the MBS’s revenue of a MBS optimal contract with inputs {λ′t}.
The proof of this proposition is given in Appendix G. With Proposition 5 and Proposition 6,
we can directly obtain a conclusion that, there exists a highest value of the MBS’s revenue
by manipulating the height of the UAVs, as long as the UAVs are horizontally symmetrically
distributed around the MBS, as shown in Section V-B.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we simulate and compare the outcomes of the MBS optimal contract and
the social optimal contract under different settings. Simulation setups are given in Section V-A,
simulation results and corresponding discussions are provided in Section V-B.
A. Simulation Setups
We set M within [100, 300], which is sufficient to generally evaluate a real system such as
LTE [29]. The terrain parameters are set as a = 11.95 and b = 0.136, indicating a typical
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urban environment. We also set the transmission power as PUAV < PMBS , due to the typical
consideration of UAVs that they have limited battery capacities. Details of the settings of all the
parameters can be found in Table II.
TABLE II
SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Terrain parameters a and b 11.95 and 0.136
Additional pathloss parameters ηNOLS and ηLOS 2 and 20
Transmission power PMBS and PUAV 10W and 50mW
Downlink transmission frequency f 3GHz
Height of UAVs H (m) between 200 and 1000
Average active user density σn (km
−2) between 10 and 20
Number of UAVs’ types T between 1 and 20
Number of each type of UAVs {Nt} between 1 and 10
Average active user number of UAVs {λt} between 1 and 20
Average active user number of MBS λBS between 10 and 200
Number of total channels of MBS M between 100 and 300
In the following simulations, we first study the UAV offloading system based on given
UAV types (i.e., fixed active user number for each UAV), from which we can acquire basic
comprehension of the MSB optimal contract and the social optimal contract. Then we further
study a more practical scenario where the height of the UAVs determines the types of them.
B. Simulation Results and Discussions
We first illustrate the typical structure of the contract that designed according to our algorithm,
as given in Fig. 4, where we set T = 10, {Nt} = (1, 1, · · ·1), {λt} = (1, 2, · · ·10), andM = 200.
All the four subplots show the patterns of {wt}, {pt}, and {U(t, wt)−pt} with respect to different
type λt. To be specific, subplots (a) and (b) show the results of lightly loaded MBS (λBS = 120)
while (c) and (d) show the results of heavily loaded MBS (λBS = 160). In addition, subplots
(a) and (c) are the outcomes of MBS optimal contracts while (b) and (d) are the outcomes of
social optimal contracts. In any one of these subplots, we can see that a higher type of UAV
is allocated with more channels but also a higher price. It can also be observed that a higher
type gains more profit compared with a lower type, i.e., U(i, wi)−pi ≤ U(j, wj)−pj as long as
i < j. In Fig. 4 (a), it is noticeable that for λ8, λ9 and λ10-types, the allocated channels exceed
their respective average user numbers. Such phenomenon is quite reasonable since a UAV needs
more channels w than its average active user number λ to deal with the situation of burst access.
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∑
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(d) Social Optimal, Heavily Loaded MBS
∑
Ntwt = 45
Average user number
Allocated bandwidth
Price being charged
Profit
Fig. 4. The structure of the optimal contracts where T = 10, {Nt} = (1, 1, · · · 1), {λt} = (1, 2, · · · 10), and M = 200, with
λBS = 120 for (a) and (b), and λBS = 160 for (c) and (d). In addition, (a) and (c) show MBS optimal contracts while (b) and
(d) show social optimal contracts.
And due to the IP property, higher types consider additional channels more valuable than lower
types. Therefore, only λ8, λ9 and λ10-types are allocated with excessive channels. By comparing
Fig. 4 (a) with Fig. 4 (b), or Fig. 4 (c) with Fig. 4 (d), we find that a social optimal contract
allocates more channels than a MBS optimal contract, where we have 60 against 71 in (a) and
(b), and 39 against 45 in (c) and (d). It can be considered that a social optimal contract is more
“generous” than a MBS optimal contract. By comparing Fig. 4 (a) with Fig. 4 (c), or Fig. 4 (b)
with Fig. 4 (d), we can also find the difference of the numbers of totally allocated channels.
This is because the cost of a heavily loaded MBS allocating the same number of channels is
greater than that of a lightly loaded MBS.
To better explain the aforementioned bandwidth differences, we provide Fig. 5 to show how
social welfare and the MBS’s revenue change during the algorithm with W setting from 0 to
M (as described in line 5 in Table I). In Fig. 5 (a), the upmost blue curve shows the change
of social welfare during the social optimal algorithm. The highest point of this curve represents
the corresponding social optimal contract, which makes W = 71 just as given in Fig. 4 (b).
The lowermost orange curve shows the corresponding change of the MBS’s revenue during the
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Fig. 5. The change of social welfare and MBS’s revenue during the social optimal algorithm and MBS optimal algorithm,
where T = 10, {Nt} = (1, 1, · · · 1), {λt} = (1, 2, · · · 10), M = 200, with λBS = 120 for (a) and λBS = 160 for (b).
social optimal algorithm. For the MBS optimal algorithm, the resulting curve of the the MBS’s
revenue lies above the orange one from the social optimal algorithm, while the resulting curve of
social welfare lies below the blue one from the social optimal algorithm. Since the two groups of
curves do not coincide, we can deduce that the structure of the solutions of the two algorithms
are not identical. For a fixed W , the MBS optimal algorithm somehow changes the allocation
of channels among different types to increase the MBS’s revenue, which results in a reduction
of social welfare. And the bandwidth allocation of the MBS optimal contract is W = 60, just
as given in Fig. 4 (a). In Fig 5 (b), we also show the situation of heavily loaded MBS, where
the relation of these curves are similar, as well as the reason that causes this.
Fig. 6 illustrates the impacts of λBS (i.e., the load of the MBS) on the different part of the
utility of the whole system as presented in Fig. 3. From Fig. 6 (a) we can see that, the difference
of allocated channels between the MBS optimal contract and the social optimal contract becomes
smaller as the load of MBS gets heavier. This is due to the fact that the cost of MBS rises fast
when it is heavily loaded and neither the MBS optimal or the social optimal contract can allocate
enough channels as desired. Fig. 6 (b) shows us that the MBS optimal contract is able to guarantee
a high level of total prices that being charged as the MBS is not heavily loaded. In addition,
the total prices being charged according to the social optimal contract is not monotonous and
may rapidly change. For the case λBS>150, although the total price being charged in the MBS
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Fig. 6. The impacts of λBS , where T = 10, {Nt} = (1, 1, · · · 1), {λt} = (1, 2, · · · 10) and M = 200.
optimal contract is lower than that in the social optimal contract, the final revenue of the MBS is
still higher in the MBS optimal contract as shown in Fig. 6 (c). This is because the MBS optimal
contract has less total bandwidth being sold, which reduces the cost of the MBS. The social
welfare is given in Fig. 6 (d), which implies that for both MBS and social optimal contracts, a
heavier loaded MBS could bring a lower overall system efficiency.
Finally, we take a look at the impact of the height of the UAVs, as presented in Fig. 7, where
M = 200, λBS = 150. The considered 10 UAVs are located 1000m horizontally from the MBS
and symmetrically distributed. The average active user density of the effective offloading region
of UAVn (i.e., σn) is set from 10km
−2 to 20km−2. From the top three subplots in Fig. 7, we
can see that the offloading regions of these UAVs first expand then shrink when the height of
the UAVs monotonously increases. The maximum offloading areas can be achieved at H=674,
where the UAVs can cover the largest number of active users, as given in Fig. 7 (d). In addition,
the MBS’s revenue can be maximized when offloading areas become the largest, as discussed
in Section IV. It can also be observed in Fig. 7 (f) that the profile of the social welfare in the
MBS optimal contract is very close to that of that social welfare in the social optimal contract.
In addition, the best height for the social optimal contract (H =676) is very close to the best
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Fig. 7. The impact of the height of UAVs. The subplots (a), (b) and (c) show the top views of the cell partition with different
height settings. The white areas represent MBS’s effective service regions, while gray areas represent UAVs’ effective offloading
regions. The subplot (d) provides the impact on the type of each UAV with different active user density. The subplots (e) and
(f) illustrate the impacts of the height of UAVs on “MBS’s revenue” and “social welfare”, respectively.
height for the MBS optimal contract (H = 674). Therefore, we can infer that, the height H
that designated by the selfish MBS manager will generally keep a high social welfare. In other
words, the performance of the overall system will not be significantly impaired.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we focused on the scenario where the UAVs were deployed in a cellar network
to better serve local mobile users. Considering the selfish MBS manager and the selfish UAV
operators, we modeled the utilities and the costs of spectrum trading among them and formulated
the problem of designing the optimal contract for the MBS manager. To deduce the optimal
contract, we first derived the optimal pricing strategy based on a fixed quality assignment, and
then analyze and transform the optimal quality assignment problem, in which way it can be
solved by the proposed dynamic programming algorithm in polynomial time. In the simulations,
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by comparing with the social optimal contract, we found that the MBS optimal contract allocated
fewer channels to the UAVs to guarantee a lower level of costs. Moreover, the best height of
the UAVs for the selfish MBS manager can keep a high performance of the overall system.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Proof: Consider Xα as a Poisson distribution random variable with mean value α, we have
P (Xα ≥ k) = 1− P (Xα < k) = 1− e
−α
k−1∑
i=0
αi
i!
. Since α can be a real number in its definition
domain, we derive the derivative of P (Xα ≥ k) with respect to α, given as
∂P (Xα ≥ k)
∂α
= e−α
k−1∑
i=0
αi
i!
− e−α
∂
∂α
( k−1∑
i=0
αi
i!
)
.
For k = 1,
∂
∂α
( k−1∑
i=0
αi
i!
)
= 0. And for k > 1,
∂
∂α
( k−1∑
i=0
αi
i!
)
=
k−1∑
i=1
αi−1
(i− 1)!
=
k−2∑
i=0
αi
i!
. Therefore,
we have
∂P (Xα ≥ k)
∂α
= e−α
αk−1
(k − 1)!
> 0, ∀k ∈ Z+ and α > 0. With any given λ > λ′ > 0,
we can deduce that P (Xλ ≥ k)− P (Xλ′ ≥ k) =
∫ λ
λ′
∂P (Xα ≥ k)
∂α
dα > 0, ∀k ∈ Z+.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Proof: Consider a fixed value w∈N and λ>λ′>0. If w=0, we have U(λ, w)=U(λ′, w) = 0
according to the definition. If w > 0, then U(λ, w) − U(λ′, w) =
k=w∑
k=1
[
P (Xλ ≥ w) − P (Xλ′ ≥
w)
]
>0 according to Lemma 1. Therefore, U(λ, w) monotonously increases with λ.
Now consider a fixed λ > 0 and ∀w > w′ ≥ 0, where w,w′ ∈ N. We have U(λ, w) −
U(λ, w′) = P (Xλ ≥ w) + · · · + P (Xλ ≥ w
′ + 1) ≥ P (Xλ ≥ w) > 0. Therefore, U(λ, w)
monotonously increases with w.
For a fixed λ > 0 and ∀w ≥ 1, we have U ′(w) = U(λ, w) − U(λ, w − 1) = P (Xλ ≥ w).
And for w ≥ 2, we have U ′′(w) = U ′(w)− U ′(w − 1) = −P (Xλ = w − 1) < 0. Therefore, the
marginal increase of U(λ, w) with respect to w gets smaller as w increases.
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APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Proof: According to the definitions of the utility function in (8) and (9), we have
U(λ, w)− U(λ, w′) = P (Xλ ≥ w) + · · ·+ P (Xλ ≥ w
′ + 1), (31)
U(λ′, w)− U(λ′, w′) = P (Xλ′ ≥ w) + · · ·+ P (Xλ′ ≥ w
′ + 1). (32)
Based on Lemma 1, each term in (31) is greater than each corresponding term in (32). Therefore
we can obtain U(λ, w)− U(λ, w′) > U(λ′, w)− U(λ′, w′).
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Proof: Necessity: These 3 conditions can be deduced from the IC & IR constraints and
the IP property as follows: 1) Since {λ1, λ2, · · ·λT} is written in the ascending order, we have
0 ≤ w1 ≤ w2 ≤ · · · ≤ wT and 0 ≤ p1 ≤ p2 ≤ · · · ≤ pT according to Proposition 3, where
wi = wi+1 if and only if pi = ii+1. 2) Considering the IR constraint of λ1-type UAVs, we
can directly obtain 0 ≤ p1 ≤ U(λ1, w1). Here, if wx = 0, then U(λt, wt) = 0 and pt = 0
for any t ≤ x. 3) Considering the IC constraint for the k-type and the (k − 1)-type where
k > 1, the corresponding expressions are given by U(λk, wk) − pk ≥ U(λk, wk−1) − pk−1, and
U(λk−1, wk−1) − pk−1 ≥ U(λk−1, wk) − pk. As we focus on the possible scope of pk, we can
deduce that pk−1 +
[
U(λk−1, wk)− U(λk−1, wk−1)
]
≤ pk ≤ pk−1 +
[
U(λk, wk)− U(λk, wk−1)
]
.
Sufficiency: We have to prove that the prices {(pt)} determined by these conditions satisfy
the IC and IR constraints. And the basic idea is to use mathematical induction, from (w1, p1) to
(wT , pT ), by adding the quality-price terms once at a time into the whole contract. For writing
simplicity, the contract that only contains the first k types of UAVs is denoted as Ψ(k), where
Ψ(k) =
{
(wt, pt)
}
, 1 ≤ t ≤ k. First, we can verify that w1 ≥ 0 and 0 < pi < U(λ1, w1) provided
by the above conditions is feasible in Ψ(1), since the IR constraint U(λ1, w1)−pi > 0 is satisfied
and the IC constraint is not useful in a single-type contract.
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In the rest part of our proof, we show that if Ψ(k) is feasible, then Ψ(k+ 1) is also feasible,
where k + 1 ≤ T . To this end, we need to prove that (1) the newly added λk+1-type complies
with its IC and IR constraints, given by
 U(λk+1, wk+1)− pk+1 ≥ U(λk+1, wi)− pi, ∀i = 1, 2, · · · , k,U(λk+1, wk+1)− pk+1 ≥ 0, (33)
and (2) the existing k types still comply with their IC constraints with the addition of λk+1-type,
given by
U(λi, wi)− pi ≥ U(λi, wk+1)− pk+1, ∀i = 1, 2, · · · , k. (34)
First, we prove (33): Since Ψ(k) is feasible, the IC constraint of λk-type should be satisfied,
given by U(λk, wi) − pi ≤ U(λk, wk) − pk, ∀i = 1, 2, · · · , k. Based on the right inequal-
ity in the third condition, we have pk+1 ≤ pk + U(λk+1, wk+1) − U(λk+1, wk). By adding
up these two inequalities, we have U(λk, wi) − pi + pk+1 ≤ U(λk, wk) + U(λk+1, wk+1) −
U(λk+1, wk), ∀i = 1, 2, · · · , k. According to the IP property, we can obtain that U(λk, wk) −
U(λk, wi) ≤ U(λk+1, wk)−U(λk+1, wi), ∀i = 1, 2, · · · , k, since λk+1 > λk and wk ≥ wi. Again,
by combining these two inequalities together, we can prove the IC constraint of the λk+1-type,
given by U(λk+1, wk+1) − pk+1 ≥ U(λk+1, wi) − pi, ∀i = 1, 2, · · · , k. The IR constraint of
the λk+1-type can be easily deduced from the above IC constraint since U(λk+1, wi) − pi ≥
U(λi, wi)− pi ≥ 0, ∀i = 1, 2, · · · , k. And therefore, we have U(λk+1, wk+1)− pk+1 ≥ 0.
Then, we prove (34): Since Ψ(k) is feasible, the IC constraint of λi-type, i = 1, 2, · · · , k,
should be satisfied, given by U(λi, wk)−pk ≤ U(λi, wi)−pi, ∀i = 1, 2, · · · , k. Based on the left
inequality in the third condition, we have pk + U(λk, wk+1)− U(λk, wk) ≤ pk+1. By adding up
the above two inequalities, we have U(λi, wk) + U(λk, wk+1) − U(λk, wk) ≤ U(λi, wi) − pi +
pk+1∀i = 1, 2, · · · , k. According to the IP property, we can obtain that U(λi, wk+1)−U(λi, wk) ≤
U(λk, wk+1)− U(λk, wk), ∀i = 1, 2, · · · , k,since λk ≥ λi and wk+1 ≥ wk. Again, by combining
the above two inequalities together, we can prove the IC constraint of the existing types, λi,
∀i = 1, 2, · · · , k, given by U(λi, wi)− pi ≥ U(λi, wk+1)− pk+1.
So far, we have proved that Ψ(1) is feasible, and if Ψ(k) is feasible then Ψ(k + 1) is also
feasible. We can conclude that the final contract Ψ(T ) which includes all the types is feasible.
Therefore, these three necessary conditions are also sufficient conditions.
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APPENDIX E
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
Proof: By comparing (17) with Lemma 2, we can find that {pˆt} is a feasible pricing strategy.
In the following, we first prove that {pˆt} is optimal, then prove that it is unique.
Optimality: In the condition that quality assignment {wt} is fixed, {pˆt} is optimal if and
only if
∑T
t=1
(
Nt · pˆt
)
≥
∑T
t=1
(
Nt · pt
)
, where {pt} is any pricing strategy that satisfies the
conditions in Lemma 2. Let’s assume that there exists another better strategy {p˜t} for the MBS
manager, i.e.,
∑T
t=1
(
Nt · p˜t
)
≥
∑T
t=1
(
Nt · pˆt
)
. Since Nt > 0 for all t = 1, 2, · · · , T , there is
at least one k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , T} that satisfies p˜k > pˆk. To guarantee that {p˜t} is still feasible, the
following inequality must be complied with according to Lemma 2: p˜k ≤ p˜k−1 + U(λk, wk) −
U(λk, wk−1), if k > 1. Since p˜k > pˆk, we have pˆk < p˜k−1 + U(λk, wk)− U(λk, wk−1), if k > 1.
By substituting (17) into the above inequality, we have p˜k−1 > pˆk+U(λk, wk)−U(λk, wk−1) =
pˆk−1, if k > 1. Repeat this process and we can finally obtain the result that p˜1 > pˆ1 = U(λ1, w1),
which contradicts with Lemma 2 where p1 should not exceed U(λ1, w1). Due to this contradiction,
the above assumption that {p˜t} is better than {pˆt} is impossible. Therefore, {pˆt} is the optimal
pricing strategy for the MBS manager.
Uniqueness: Assume that there exists another pricing strategy {p˜t} 6= {pˆt}, such that
∑T
t=1
(
Nt·
p˜t
)
=
∑T
t=1
(
Nt · pˆt
)
. Since Nt > 0 for all t = 1, 2, · · · , T , there is at least one k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , T}
that satisfies p˜k 6= pˆk. If p˜k > pˆk, then the same contradiction occurs just like we’ve discussed
above. If p˜k < pˆk, then there must exist another p˜l > pˆl to maintain
∑T
t=1
(
Nt · p˜t
)
=∑T
t=1
(
Nt · pˆt
)
. Either way, the contradiction is unavoidable, which implies that the optimal
pricing strategy {pˆt} is unique.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
Proof: We use φ (in radian) instead of θ (in degree) to denote the elevation angle, where
φ = θ · pi/180◦. For a user with horizontal distance r to the UAV, the average pathloss is given
by LUAV (φ, r) = LLoS(d)PLoS(θ) + LNLoS(d)
[
1− PLoS(θ)
]
. With minor deduction, we have
LUAV (φ, r) = LNLoS(d)− η · PLoS(θ), (35)
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where η = ηNLoS−ηLoS < ηNLoS , d =
r
cosφ
, θ =
180◦
pi
φ. By denoting ηNLoS as L1 and η ·
PLoS(θ) as L2 to simplify the writing, we can provide the following assertions based on (1):
As φ increases from 0 to pi/2, L1 increases monotonously from LNLoS(r) to infinity, while L2
monotonously increases within a sub-interval of (0, η). Therefore, 0<LUAV (0, r)<LNLoS(r),
and LUAV (φ, r)→+∞ as φ→pi/2. In addition, LUAV (φ, r) has lower bound,
[
LNLoS(r)−ηNLoS
]
,
in the whole definition domain [0, pi/2]. By considering the partial derivative of LUAV (φ, r) with
respect to φ, we have
∂LUAV (φ, r)
∂φ
=
∂L1
∂φ
−
∂L2
∂φ
=
20
ln 10
tanφ−
180◦pi−1abη exp [−b(θ − a)]
{1 + a exp [−b(θ − a)]}2
. (36)
where we have ∂L1/∂φ = 0 as φ = 0, ∂L1/∂φ → +∞ as φ → +∞, and ∂L2/∂φ > 0 as
∀φ ∈ [0, pi/2). Therefore, we can conclude that LUAV (φ, r) decreases near φ = 0 and rapidly
increases to +∞ near φ = pi/2.
By now we have confirmed that: (a) LUAV (φ, r) decreases near pi = 0; (b) LUAV (φ, r) increases
to infinity as φ → pi/2; and (c) LUAV (φ, r) has a lower bound in [0, pi/2). Therefore, there is
at least one minimal value as φ ∈ (0, pi/2) that is smaller than LUAV (0, r), which makes the
existence of a minimum value as φ ∈ (0, pi/2). Fig. 8 provides a exemplary illustration of
LUAV (φ, r) with different r values.
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Fig. 8. (a) shows the pathloss in a typical suburban terrain, where parameters a = 5, b = 0.2, ηLoS = 0.1, and ηNLoS = 21.
(b) shows the pathloss in a typical dense urban terrain, where parameters a = 14, b = 0.12, ηLoS = 1.6, and ηNLoS = 23.
The effective offloading region of the UAV, however, is based on the SNR of each possible
location. Rigorous mathematical analysis would be highly difficult, thus only a simple discussion
is provided as following. Since we have assumed that the UAVs have the same height and the
fixed horizontal locations, we can first conclude that, if a user is horizontally nearest to UAVn,
then the SNR from UAVn is always the largest among all the UAVs no matter how large H is.
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Therefore, the user partition among UAVs are independent of H , and we only have to care about
whether the SNR from UAVn (γUAVn) is greater than the SNR from the MBS (γMBS). For any
given location, the scope of H that satisfies γUAVn > γMBS can be either an empty interval or
one or more disjoint intervals (called as the effective height interval of this user), depending on
the number and the values of the minimal points of LUAV (φ, r).
At the height of H , the effective offloading area of UAVn, (given by Sn), depends on whether
the value of H resides in the the effective height interval of each possible location on the ground.
The theoretical deduction of the optimal height that maximizes Sn is intractable. However, the
existence of such optimal height can be guaranteed, since the effective height intervals are either
empty or within [0,+∞).
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6
Proof: For the MBS optimal contract based on {λt}, the bandwidth allocation is denoted
as {wt} and the corresponding cost of the MBS is denoted as C
(∑
wt
)
. If we change the types
from {λt} to {λ
′
t} and assume that the bandwidth allocation remains to be {wt}, the cost of
the MBS will still be C
(∑
wt
)
. Since λt ≤ λ
′
t, we have U(λt, w) < U(λ
′
t, w) according to
Proposition 1. And based on (17), we can deduce that pt will be greater, for any t = 1 · · ·T .
Therefore, the sum of prices will gets larger, and the revenue of the MBS will increase from Rˆ
to Rˆw. Note that the above discussion is based on the assumption that {wt} remain the same,
which is probably not an optimal bandwidth allocation for {λ′t}. If we run the algorithm in
Section III-D, the final revenue Rˆ′ that based on another bandwidth allocation {w′t} will be
greater than Rˆw. Therefore, we have Rˆ ≤ Rˆw ≤ Rˆ
′.
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